I really like the mesh type fail over this program attempts to provide. Finally, I must stay within Apple's ecosystem to get all its benefits and I don't use MacOS as frequently as I used to. ![]() But again, I must trust Apple, and the system in't fullproof as its possible to spoof clients although much more difficult with 2 factor authentication enabled. I also appreciate that it attempts to encrypt my communications. I've been using Apple's iMessage service on my iphone, which is encrypted and convenient because it works and communicates with other SMS clients seamlessly. I frequently use Teamspeak for voice communications on a private server, however I'm not sure how much I trust that my private server isn't "listening" to my conversation anyway since the software is closed source. Bitmessage leverages a side effect of the cryptography elements in PoW to make a spam resistant private messaging system, but it could not, and would not be private nor would it be scalable or deployable on devices with limited resources with a full blockchain implementation.īack to the original topic, I've been interested in using a program like this for a while. It only makes sense in scenarios where you either need to convert energy into value, secure a P2P financial system, or make your network expensive to DDoS. What makes it useful is that it makes a high volume of transactions expensive. Proof of work was originally conceptualized as a spam prevention mechanism. What advantage would this convey over public key cryptography? By design, only the holder of the private key can be corresponded with, so why in the world would you need to verify that with a group of other third parties? This only serves to erode the privacy and anonymity of the encrypted communication. We've already established you have a very poor understanding of Blockchain and Proof-of-work, no need to keep repeating it. Something like it where everything can be verified I posted it here in the news category partly because I don't know any other category that fits it better, and partly so and might see it for their news show tomorrow ![]() PS: I saw that there is a post on the Lounge by but I wanted to give it its own thread, since it didn't seem to get any attraction. If the internet's up, Briar can sync via the Tor network, protecting users and their relationships from surveillance. If the internet's down, Briar can sync via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, keeping the information flowing in a crisis. Unlike traditional messaging apps, Briar doesn't rely on a central server - messages are synchronized directly between the users' devices. The app is currently only available as FOSS for Android, but has already been audited by Cure53 and is considered secure with good code quality.īriar is a messaging app designed for activists, journalists, and anyone else who needs a safe, easy and robust way to communicate. Yesterday I heard from Briar which tries to solve these problem by using peer-to-peer communication over the Tor network while the Internet is up, but can resort to communication via Bluetooth and WiFi if it's not. Apart from that, if the government decides to "turn off" the internet, there is no way to communicate with those apps and your smartphone basically becomes a paper weight. For those unaware, the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database or DBX is basically a block-list for blacklisted UEFI executables that were found to be bad or harmful.These days end-to-end encrypted messaging apps are ubiquitous, but it's nearly impossible to find one that doesn't rely on a central server that can not only be blocked to block the service, but can also aid in collecting metadata about its user. Hence, the DBX or UEFI revocation list can only hold a limited number of such files. The company explains that the Secure Boot DBX list already contains some of the vulnerable UEFI application binaries but it is limited in terms of storage as it is on the firmware flash memory. In case you missed it, the company also made some modifications to its support article under KB5025885.įollowing that, earlier today, Microsoft also published a guidance article outlining how one can block vulnerable Windows Boot Managers or bootkits. The issue is being tracked under CVE-2023-24932, and Microsoft stated that Patch Tuesday marked the initial deployment phase of the security fix. A bootkit is essentially a malicious Windows Boot Manager. ![]() ![]() Microsoft had previously already published a guide on how to detect a system compromised by BlackLotus UEFI bootkit. The Redmond giant has patched the BlackLotus UEFI security flaw which has been known to bypass measures like Secure Boot, VBS, BitLocker, Defender. Alongside that, the tech giant also published a guidance document for a major security bug. Microsoft released Patch Tuesday updates for the month of May 2023 earlier this week on Windows 10, Windows 11, and Server.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |